Greece: refugee crisis on a knife’s edge

Dimitris Christopoulos
The following text is written before both the Malta Summit and the Paris terror attacks of November 13th. It is more than certain that particularly the Paris events will seal the European management of the refugee crisis, driving EU member-States to enforce  restrictive policies. Still, this won't bring about any "solutions". It might, on the contrary, lead to opposite results. 
1,000% increase in refugee flows!

By the end of winter last year, it became clear that there would be a dramatic escalation in the flow of refugees; people had lost any hope of returning to their homeland –mainly Syria– from the bordering countries, and they decided to take the long road to Europe. However, even the most educated of the projections back then failed to conceive the severity of the refugee crisis that followed: in 2014 Greece received 77,000 people and there was an expectation of three times this figure in 2015.  Things, however, turned out slightly differently:  up to mid-October the total number of migrants and refugees was well over half a million.  And a few days later we are witnessing the Aegean becoming a watery grave for hundreds of people, as the weather is getting worse and people are trying to make their passage before winter makes sea crossing impossible. Chances are that, if there is no change, this tragedy will continue well into November.  Autumn is a perfect time for both hopes and fatalities.  One thing is for sure:  the overall 2015 figure will be around 700,000 people, an astonishing 1,000% increase compared to 2014.
Greece is indeed in a very difficult position:  as if it hadn’t got enough on its plate, it now has to handle flows of refugees under unbearable conditions.  What has the Greek state done up to now?  What are the positive and negative aspects of its handling of the refugee crisis?
Major victory: shifting the agenda
The government’s most significant accomplishment is the shifting of the agenda: judging from their performance in the past, we are, unfortunately, almost certain that previous governments would have sustained the narrative we had known for years – i.e. “make their life a living hell so that they don’t come at all or they leave as soon as possible”.  Rhetoric shifted from talking about “reclaiming our city centres” to praising “support for war victims”.  We shifted from pro-active and violent push-backs in the Aegean to search and rescue operations.  I would have liked to be able to argue that we have also shifted from detention centres to somewhere else but I hesitate because there is nothing in place; the country is missing any kind of serious infrastructure alternative to detention.
This is serious stuff:  in the midst of their own desperation and social anguish, Greek people still haven’t turned refugees into scapegoats, blaming them for all their trouble.  Staying calm, showing understanding that in many cases turned into solidarity in the face of the tragedy refugees were going through, Greek people have demonstrated a remarkable human maturity.  Either due to the tone of the Government’s rhetoric, or due to the deep emotion that the pictures of dead children has evoked, or just because they realised that other, more drastic solutions would effectively mean murdering refugees, Greeks have perceived the refugee tragedy in a humanitarian and realistic way.   Even the Golden Dawn fascists failed to raise the issue during their pre-election campaign; they understood there was not the scope they had expected there to be.  On its part, New Democracy made a futile, and failed, attempt to highlight it.  All political parties of the so-called “constitutional axis”, including the Right, are now very cautious when referring to the refugee issue.  The notion of “Greeks’ humanity” is widely acknowledged, even if it is just a pretence.  And I will explain why.
The major drawback:  little more than words
The major positive narrative about the refugee crisis that the Government has put forward, has been crucial in making sure that the Greek public reacts in a calm way; this should not be underestimated.  Had there been another government in power, Europe would have run the risk of having yet another Hungary on Aegean shores. European Union would then be shedding crocodile tears, publicly deploring the situation, and rubbing their hands in glee behind closed doors as it would have found a government to do the dirty work exactly where it should be done.  Back in 2012, when Greece was putting up the Evros fence, the EU did not see our country as a miasma. Today I don’t believe that the EU considers the possibility of demolishing the fence or even allowing people to pass freely through. Quite the opposite, Hungary is building walls, acting to the detriment of all the rest of the EU, in the sense that these walls would just “protect” Hungary; they would only change the direction of the refugee flows. But if Greece were to carry out forced returns in the Aegean, if it were to send troops to its borders, this would not be seen as Greece looking after its own little national self; it would be Greece defending the common European “interest”.  However, fortunately, things didn’t turn out quite that way.
But beyond that, what has the Greek state actually done?  Humanitarianism is much more than playing the generous traffic policeman on refugee crossroads, showing people the road to the North and nothing else.  Of course, Greece is not refugees’ final destination, everybody knows that.  But the fact that we are a transit country shouldn’t be an excuse for Greece to shirk its responsibilities towards these people.  Greek facilities today can accommodate 400 unaccompanied minors, 600 asylum seekers and 700 people at the Elaionas transit centre in Athens, i.e. 1,700 places in total.  This is not what a European state should look like in 2015; it is a disgrace.
At the mini Summit in Brussels on 25 October, Greece agreed to provide accommodation for 20,000 people through subsidised rented flats, plus temporary accommodation facilities for 30,000 more people.  So Greece has to do what it hasn’t done over the past decade; and to deliver it in 10 weeks - not an easy task.  I am trying to get my head around it but I cannot see how the government is going to pull this one off.  Greek public administration, from ministers to clerks, have a very powerful mindset:  the country’s single obligation towards these people is to make sure that no one is drowned and to let them cross the country quietly; and that’s that.  Come 2016, the EU will once again have to face the fact that Greece most probably will not have delivered on its promises. And then, the “relocation” agreement will be up in the air. An agreement that, in any case, excludes the Afghanis, the second largest refugee group who are less welcome to Europe.  So Greece - and Serbia – the generous traffic policemen of the region, will become Europe’s warehouse wardens.
For Greece the refugee issue is on a knife edge; the sooner we are clear about this, the better.  At the end of the day, humanitarianism means more when it takes the form of action rather than words. Even now, at the end of 2015, in the game’s extra time, Greece needs to take some action; it needs to show, for the first time, that it is able to assume part of the common European responsibility.  Otherwise, the way things are going, we will end up taking the blame for much more than our fair share.

Dimitris Christopoulos is the Vice President of the International Federation for Human Rights, an Associate Professor of Political Science, Panteion University, Athens.
Translated by Mary Zambetaki
First published in Greek on RedNotebook, 2.11.2015

Reshuffling & mobilisation of the left movement

Our basic goal is to move forward with the reshuffling and mobilisation of the movement within the Left
Interview with Sokratis Giannopoulos (former SYRIZA Youth)
 The Greek elections are coming on the 20th of September. We ask four comrades and friends (Anastasia Giamali from SYRIZA, Yiannos Giannoulos from Laiki Enotita, Sokratis Giannopoulos from the former Youth of SYRIZA, Kostas Gousis from ANTARSYA) some questions about their experience of the Left Government, the split of SYRIZA, the relationship between Greece and Europe, the Memorandum, and the political positions of the party they support. They answered not as representatives of each party, but according to their personal opinion and, at the same time, as supporters or candidates of each party.
Syriza Youth was founded in 2013 as a radical Left youth organisation aiming to contribute to a contemporary left project for the 21st century. It grew from critically drawing experience from the political projects undertaken by the Left during the past century, as well as  the anti-globalisation movement, the Greek and European Social Forums, the feminist and LGBTQI movements, the environmental movement and the new social movements. Syriza Youth struggled for an alternative social example based on democracy and social justice.
At the same time, Syriza Youth was firmly rooted within Syriza and strongly committed to the task of organising the representation of both the working people and the youth, as well as trying to establish the possibility of unity and re-composition of the forces of the Left.
Both the adoption of the 3rd Memorandum by the government and the subsequent manipulations by the Syriza leadership that did not allow for collective, democratic procedures for the evaluation and reconfiguration of our strategy, trapped Syriza in having to manage and implement an austerity program with no room for maneuvers. This was a framework within which the Syriza Youth could no longer function with its basic characteristics intact. Following the failure of Syriza’s executive members (as well as the sabotage of our collective procedures) to call for a party convention to resolve issues, the majority of the executive board of the youth organisation  expressed its disapproval and left the party (cf. Communication note of the majority of the members of the Central Committee of the Youth of SYRIZA).
How do you evaluate the experience of the government of the Left these seven months?
A government of the Left was clearly a very difficult and unprecedented task/, especially under the given circumstances (globalised capitalism, EU, global economic crisis). We already knew that such an effort would require multiple confrontations with well-grounded mechanisms in the Greek state, but we underestimated the international aspect. It is extremely difficult to evaluate the work of the government outside the matter of the negotiation with the creditors, because the whole governing strategy followed pre-existing assumptions that dictated the pursuit of a “mutually beneficial agreement”, and so led to the government avoiding confrontation with vested interests within the country (the February 20 agreement played a crucial role here, because it restrained the government from unilateral policy changes). As a result, the government did not dare to make any radical ruptures in favour of the weak, with the exception of some bills on human rights (prisoners, migrants etc.). In any case, what became evident was that the Left needs a holistic approach for an alternative government and for the citizens' relationship with the administration. On both political and technical levels, the state apparatus faces everyday pressures and tasks that cannot be dealt with easily. But this real problem must not become an alibi, on the contrary it must be surpassed towards the transformation of social relations in a radical direction. The effort to construct  left governmentality has surely a lot to learn from the experience of these past 7 months.
After the whole period of negotiations, we would like shortly your opinion a) the Eurozone and whether Greece should stay or not in it b) the EU as a field of struggle (for the movement, the Left etc).
Any type of social or political institution (such as the EU) is de facto open to transformations and therefore is a field of struggle. Yet this does not mean that all institutions are open at all times to any kind of transformation and in any desirable way. After the experience of the Greek negotiations, it is now clear that under the given power relations in Europe (not only on the central political level, but also the asymmetric and heterogeneous development of the European movement), the way capitalism has evolved the past few decades and the way the Eurozone has been constructed, the possibility for radical changes by a sole left government in the EZ (even if this would cause a domino effect in other countries) is virtually non-existent. The Eurozone functions as institutionalized  neoliberalism. Therefore we have to rethink our internationalist strategy through the prism of rupture with and disengagement from these supranational formations, as a question of democracy and popular sovereignty and as a prerequisite for disputing the neoliberal TINA doctrine. And we must  underline that it has created a strong movement in Europe, against austerity and the authoritarianism of the Eurozone (i.e. This is a coup) – it is very important to remember this, and not to close ourselves in the fortress of nationalism and national isolationism.
The Greek Left after several years of initiatives of collaboration like Syriza and Antarsya know is getting again split and divided. How do you evaluate the current situation and which do you believe are the future perspectives?

Without a doubt, the defeat of Syriza and the bankruptcy of its strategy (SYRIZA was a hegemonic force in the Greek Left but also in the Greek society during the past few years) will have a profound effect on the rest of the Left. Besides, the strategic excess needed for the Left to threaten the capitalist imperative doesn't apply to Syriza alone, but to all forces of the Left. Syriza itself ended up failing because it couldn't exceed a series of strategic deadlocks of the traditional Left, even though it was one of its founding goals. However, the historic course of Syriza and of the social movements of the past decades have left an important legacy, with both positive and negative elements, by , with,which a culture of reshuffling of the forces of the Left could be re-established.

In order for this process of reshuffling to succeed,  two factors will need to emerge simultaneously. Firstly, social factors that will bring forth new radical demands and ideas for the construction of social counter-paradigms; secondly, political factors that will engage in transformative procedures and at the same time try to take on the strategic questions the left has been facing from the beginning of the 21st century.

I think that there is a lot of potential in Greece, and young people have a catalytic role to play in these processes because they have accumulated huge amounts of knowledge, new ideas and capabilities that modern day capitalism casts aside. The challenge we face is to channel all this wealth into a direction of creative political engagement that will aim at the construction of social relations in direct opposition to the dominant ones. There are already examples of such efforts around us and organised forces of the left have significant contributions in them. The question is how to turn these examples  that are now the exception into the rule in the lives of the people and also how to combine them with new relations and institutions of representation. All these are basic elements of a new political plan for the Left. The organised Left has  what it takes to  be the catalyst in this process.
What do you think are the immediate political priority for the majority of the executive board of the youth organisation of Syriza who left the party (cf. their communication note here) after the elections of 20/9?
Our basic goal for the next day of the elections is to move forward with the reshuffling and mobilisation of the movement within the left. There is no blueprint for it nor could there be from this conjuncture. Of course there are many interesting ideas, discussions and possibilities. It is very important to leave the necessary space for strategic discussion and evaluation of our experience this far, as well as for political planning and action.
 The recent years, Greece became the center of interest for the international movement because of the struggle of Greek people against austerity and also because of SYRIZA becoming the first left government. Where do you think we stand today after the signing of the third Memorandum? What is your message to the people that struggle in Europe and in the whole world?
We are certainly not where we were in recent years. The situation has changed dramatically and the experience of the Greek negotiations has offered food for thought and action for all European people. We are now in a situation where a lot is at stake on many different levels. It is not enough to wait for the “Greek miracle” anymore, in order to defeat austerity and initiate a domino of change in Europe. Initiatives of coordination, planning and common action are of course indispensable. Internationalism must remain the cornerstone of our political strategy when we talk about the potential that a disengagement from the EU might unleash (easily said than done, of course). In any case, we have to work on the question of an alternative perspective for Europe, not as an abstract appeal or battle cry, but as a live process that will change the everyday lives of the people.
Sokratis Giannopoulos is a trainee psychiatrist,  former member of the executive board of the youth organisation of Syriza

  • Published in POLITICS

The SYRIZA Split and Popular Unity (LAE)

From the Referendum to the split  of Syriza and the creation of Popular Unity (LAE): Α critical presentation

Dimosthenis Papadatos-Anagnostopoulos

Following 5 July referendum the two parties that fiercely campaigned for a NO vote and won it were fraught with splits: both SYRIZA and ANTARSYA are different parties to those that stood for election in January. However, SYRIZA’s sheer size, its position within the political system and  its stance of violent confrontation – no longer with the EU but with much of the Greek Left itself – make its own split and partial liquidation a key determinant in the coming elections. Two inter-related yet distinct processes contributed to this split and liquidation.

The first and arguably most significant of these processes, is the split of the Left Platform (LP), the main opposition within SYRIZA, and the consequent formation of Popular Unity (PU), now running for election behind Panayiotis Lafazanis.  The LP was constituted by former KKE members (also known as the Left Current) and other smaller groups – primarily anti-capitalist/Trotskyist organisations (known as the Red Network). The LP now forms the bulwark PU, in the company of groups that split from ANTARSYA (ARAN, ARAS) and former SYRIZA MPs running as independents (such as the former President of the Parliament, Zoe Konstantopoulou). The party has also received the support of the Left Radical Initiative (LRI) – an ad hoc formation of members of the ‘53+ Initiative’, the left Eurocommunist tendency of SYRIZA, some of whom remained in SYRIZA, while others left without joining PU.  

The formation of PU
The formation of PU was announced a day after the government’s resignation and the consequent call to snap elections. It should be stressed that the call to elections was the initiative of Alexis Tsipras and not of the party, none of which organs were consulted. Furthermore, it was a decision that disregarded and nullified SYRIZA’s Central Committee’s decision to hold a party conference before the elections. Thus, on 21 August, Panayiotis Lafazanis, one of the most prominent party officials of SYNASPISMOS – eventually of SYRIZA –, the leader of the LP, and a minister in the SYRIZA-ANEL government, announced that 25 MPs of the LP would be leaving SYRIZA.  The LP’s three representatives (including the ‘moderate’ Alekos Kalyvis) in the party’s Political Secretariat also left on the same day, while 53 members of the LP resigned from SYRIZA’s Central Committee shortly afterwards.

However, the liquidation of SYRIZA should not be ascribed simply to the departure of those party officials who went on to form LU. Indeed, the departure of officials and members who had belonged to the majority faction of the party and who had supported Tsipras since his early days as a leader of SYRIZA, brought about an equally damaging blow. These departures stimulated a domino effect, leading to the resignation of the party secretary, Tasos Koronakis, of the majority of the Youth Branch (a gesture accompanied by a call not to vote for SYRIZA), and of dozens of Central Committee and Provincial Committee members across the country. Following the same vein, many MPs announced that they would not run for re-election. Many of these party officials once formed Tsipras’s (very) close circle, while others represented the very groups that had founded SYRIZA – among them the 17 prominent members of KOE –a group with links to Maoism- who have been part of the party’s opposition in the past year.

Thus it appears that contrary to the party’s public statements, the SYRIZA “bleed”, that tipped the internal balance of power in favour of Tsipras’s loyal supporters, was not solely attributable to the LP. The de facto split of both the former majority and the former minority suggests an overall liquidation of the party, given the former majority had been a heterogeneous group whose cohesion was guaranteed only by its unified opposition to the LP.

Were this split and liquidation unavoidable?
Were this split and liquidation unavoidable? What is the political potential of PU now, less than a week before the general election? And what is the political map of the Left now that internal battles have torn down the euphoria brought about by the January elections?

Let us bring some facts to the table. On 10 July, three MPs and two out of the three LP members of the Political Secretariat of SYRIZA (with the exception of Alekos Kalyvis) asked Tsipras to respond to the ‘Institutions’’ blackmail surrounding a third austerity package with an ultimatum: ‘a new program with no further austerity measures that guarantees liquidity and the write-off of the debt or Greece will leave the Eurozone and will stop paying the unfair and unsustainable debt’. After that and until the parliamentary vote for the third austerity package on the 14 July, 25 MPs close to the Left Platform, together with the President of the Parliament, Zoe Konstantopoulou, voted against the proposed austerity measures, even as they pledged support for the government.

Dissenters were not only to be found among MPs or among members of the LP. On 15 July, 109 out of 201 members of SYRIZA’s Central Committee, demanded the rejection of the third austerity package and an emergency gathering of the Committee, which had been largely inactive throughout the seven months of SYRIZA’s government. At the same time, PMs from the ‘53+ Initiative’, a constitutive tendency of Tsipras’s majority, together with MPs without party tendency affiliations, occasionally chose to abstain in certain parliamentary votes.

The crisis within the party gradually spread to the government. On 17 July, a cabinet reshuffle left Panayiotis Lafazanis, Dimitris Stratoulis, Kostas Isychos, and Nadia Valavani (an independent working along with the LP who had resigned a few days earlier) without portfolios: retribution for their votes against the austerity measures required for the conclusion of the new Memorandum. After the government’s expulsion of those dissenters, an agreement could be concluded.

Despite this escalation of tensions both within the party and within the government against the backdrop of the looming third Memorandum, SYRIZA’s Central Committee did not meet until 30 July: seventeen days after the conclusion of the Memorandum agreement.  In order to avoid a split (or for others, in order to postpone it to a more auspicious time) the Central Committee avoided making any decisive statements on the third austerity package. The decision was backed by the LP in a period in which SYRIZA’s tendencies had taken to functioning as ‘cartels’ – a modus operandi inherited from SYNASPISMOS.  Thus, Tsipras’s majority proposed holding a party conference in September 2015, with the new party delegates and before general elections took place. The LP tried to push through a party conference with the same delegates as the previous one, which had taken place in July 2012, so that the Party could have a binding decision on the subject of the third austerity package before the relevant vote in the Parliament. Two weeks later, on the 14 August, the third Memorandum was voted in with 222 out of 300 MPs – a quote bought with the support of SYRIZA, ND, PASOK, and To Potami. However,  44 SYRIZA MPs voted against the party’s whip -- voting “no” or abstaining.

On 20 August, once the LP had pointed out that a party conference following the third Memorandum agreement would be entirely pointless,  Alexis Tsipras announced the resignation of the government and called snap elections, circumventing the Central Committee’s decision to hold a party conference before the next election. That was the beginning of the end of SYRIZA as we knew it. 


Who is to blame for the breakup?
For about a month and a half, Syriza turned into a blame-game playing field. Who is to blame for the breakup? Is it the party's leadership that “betrayed the Greek people's NO at the referendum, by signing an onerous 3rd Memorandum”? Or is it the Left Platform, for “being a party within the party for a long time, and finally overthrowing the first government of the Left in Europe since WWII”? Was the breakup unavoidable, given the profound divergence of viewpoints – especially as regards the Eurozone and the Memorandum – held by the party’s constituent tendencies? Is it fair to say that Alexis Tsipras' personal decision to call elections, ignoring all party procedures was, at the very least, a catalyst?

The Left Platform has every right to claim that it was alone in insisting on the need to prepare for the possibility of a Grexit. After all, it was Syriza's intention from its founding Conference (2013) that the forecasted negotiation not be a friendly chat with good-willing partners, but rather a head-on confrontation that would leave all eventualities open; Syriza summarised its policy with the motto “No sacrifice for the Euro, no delusion for the Drachma”. This stance seemed already relinquished by 20 February, when the Greek government’s agreement with the Troika included a promise to repay Greece’s non-sustainable debt in full and on time, together with the waiving of state rights to any unilateral action regarding the labour market and the banking system.  For this, Tsipras fell under heavy criticism from the Left Platform. In this context, SYRIZA’s main problem was not the Left Platform’s antagonistic strategy towards the leadership, but rather the acceptance of a 3rd Memorandum as an unavoidable choice – a gesture that drastically compromised the leadership’s reputation. To add to that,  the abolition of all democratic procedures within the party and, ultimately, the deconstruction of the party itself – given all its organs and departments were running on “safe mode” during the most critical and eventful period (from January onwards) – essentially yielded a left revival of the TINA doctrine, as many government officials reassured their European partners that they will faithfully implement a Memorandum that even the IMF finds to be at fault. The wave of resignations from SYRIZA was made up by forces much broader than today’s Left Platform. The combination of the acceptance of the 3rd Memorandum (in stark contrast to the party's policy) only one week after the resounding NO of the referendum, together with the suspension of all collective party procedures that culminated in the cancellation of an agreed Convention, proved to be explosive (though underestimated by the leadership), leading hundreds of cadres and members to resign, and many of those who stayed were left indefinitely paralysed, uncertain of what to do next.

Yet, none of the above is meant to suggest that the Left Platform is beyond reproach. In my opinion, the most serious point of critique is this: the Left Platform invests more effort in denouncing the Memorandum and in capitalising on the (well-deserved) anger at Syriza's mutation, than in a concrete alternative plan for overcoming the crisis, which will be fiercely fought by the capitalist class in both Greece and Europe. So, while Syriza leaves a window open for post-electoral cooperation with Pasok, Potami, and even ND, so as to form a coalition government that will be able to implement 56% of the Memorandum within 2015, as the 14 August agreement dictates, and while, among the forces of the Left that have a good chance to make it to Parliament in this coming election, Popular Unity seems to be the party whose program comes closest to representing the 62% of the people who voted NO, dismissing the threat that this would mean an automatic Grexit. The question seems inescapable: why, only ten days before the election, do polls show that Popular Unity will probably win less than 5-6% of the vote? How do we explain this discrepancy?

To begin with, at least for now, Popular Unity is more interested in wielding discontent for Syriza's defeat in its favour  than it is in explaining it convincingly, for example by referring to the partners' extortions, China and Russia's unwillingness to support Greece outside the Eurozone, etc. Popular Unity seems to interpret Syriza's capitulation not as defeat, but as treason – as if decisive support for a Grexit were in itself enough to turn things around. Reducing politics to the question of currency is the reason why Popular Unity seems disconnected from important struggles such as the movement against gold mining in Chalkidiki, or seems to have restricted appeal to large segments of youth, despite its efforts to approach them. What is also remarkable is that, here as well, democratic and pluralistic processes in instituting and running the new formation are underemined in favour of a hyper-centralisation that the leadership tries to justify on the grounds of the pressing timeframe to the election. 

There are of course other reasons why Popular Unity lags far behind the referendum's 62%: that NO was a phenomenon that stood and still stands in excess of party frameworks or loyalites, which makes searching for an “authentic political exponent” a futile task. What's more, widespread disappointment at the left government's capitulation and the 3rd Memorandum falls on everyone: mutatis mutandis, the collapse of actually existing socialism in 1989-1991 did not just bring the end of its proponents but also consigned its most insightful critics to near-triviality. In Greece around that same time, the breakup of the Communist Party that let thousands of its members to resign, did not bring any electoral success to the New Left Current (NAR) which received a mere 0.9% of the vote in the following election. 

While it is undoubtedly too early for anyone to predict the outcome of the tendencies presented here, it is certain that both a real political front capable of harnessing the heritage of the referendum's NO and a European anticapitalist left that – urgently necessary in the deepening capitalist crisis –, have to take into account the words of the French economist Michel Husson: “There is no easy way out of the dramatic situation in which Greece is today locked. Euro exit, now, for Greece, would perhaps be less costly than the application of the third memorandum, still more monstrous than the previous ones. But this is not a royal road, and this should be said, honestly. Then, there is the risk of making it the solution to all the problems of the Greek economy, whether they concern the productive structures or the power of the oligarchy. Euro exit is almost always presented as a sort of magic wand” [1].

Popular Unity could really contribute to deterring the “Italisation” of the Greek Left (i.e. its disintegration and vapourisation after governing experience) –that is, if it does not try to imitate the famous Italian magician, Houdini.

[1]       Michel Husson, “The good drachma? A modest contribution to the debate“, International Viewpoint, 27 August 2015,

Translated by Dimitris Ioannou and Ntina Tzouvala

  • Published in POLITICS
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